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RESUMO
DPs defi nidos fracos têm sido caracterizados como DPs que não carregam a pressuposição 
de unicidade usualmente associada ao determinante defi nido. Este artigo propõe uma análise 
unifi cada do determinante defi nido. Mostro que, associando à semântica do determinante 
defi nido ‘fraco’ a noção de familiaridade fraca (Roberts 2003), a unicidade pode ser garantida 
e também que é possível explicar a condição de prototipicalidade postulada em trabalhos 
recentes sobre o uso dos defi nidos fracos em inglês. Discutirei em particular o caso do italiano 
que possui, vou argumentar, uma classe de DPs defi nidos que análises prévias não conseguem 
explicar. 
ABSTRACT
‘Weak’ defi nite DPs are characterized as DPs lacking the uniqueness presupposition 
normally associated to the defi nite determiner. I argue for a unifi ed analysis of  the defi nite 
determiner. I show that, by implementing the semantics of  the ‘weak’ defi nite determiner 
with the notion of  weak familiarity (Roberts 2003), uniqueness can be guaranteed and that 
it is also possible to account for the condition of  prototypicality posited in recent works on 
the use weak defi nite DPs in English. I will discuss in particular the case of  Italian, which 
possess, I argue, a class of  weak defi nite DPs to which previous analyses fail to give a proper 
explanation.    
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Introduction
‘Weak’ defi nite DPs have been minimally characterized as defi nite 
DPs that lack the presupposition of  uniqueness generally associated 
with the defi nite determiner.  Carlson and Sussman (2005); Carlson et 
alii (2005) discuss the case of  the defi nite expressions in italics in the 
sentences (1) - (3) and argue that these DPs are ‘weak’, with respect to 
‘regular’ defi nite DPs, precisely in this sense.
(1) Lola is reading the newspaper.
(2) My husband is at the hospital.
(3) John was feeling sick and he called the doctor.
The main piece of  empirical evidence provided by the authors is the 
availability of  sloppy readings in coordinated elliptical sentences. The 
sentence (4-b) is a felicitous utterance in a context where (4-a) is also 
true: for (4-b) to be true, it is not necessary that Lola and Alice read 
the same newspaper, nor different tokens of  the same newspaper issue. 
That is, the defi nite DP in (4-b) does not behave like a rigid designator, 
but allows for a plurality of  referents in discourse.
(4)  a.  Lola is reading The Times, and Alice is reading The Star
b.  Lola is reading the newspaper and Alice too.
The ‘weakness’ of  defi nite DPs raises at least two questions, that 
I will try to summarize below while pointing, at the same time, to the 
solutions offered by the most recent previous accounts. 
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(i) Uniqueness and defi nite DPs. On the one hand, it questions 
the interpretation of  the defi nite determiner. Why and how does the 
defi nite determiner loose the uniqueness presupposition that, since 
Russell (1905), is associated to its semantic content? In fact, most 
analyses of  the semantics of  ‘weak’ defi nite DPs try to reconcile the 
existential interpretation of  these expressions with the original Russellian 
defi nition. In this respect, uniqueness has been accounted for in two 
ways. 
One account found in the literature, going back to Löbner (1985) 
but defended more recently also by Corblin (2011), maintains that the 
uniqueness of  the referent of  the defi nite expression is inferred through 
the existence of  a unique situation of  which it is the participant. Weak 
interpretations are due to the possibility of  referring to unique individuals 
that are participants of  distinct minimal situations or events. 
Pursuing a different line of  analysis, the presupposition of  uniqueness 
can be maintained also if  the unique referent of  defi nite DPs is not an 
object-level entity, but rather a unique abstract individual. Specifi cally, 
weak DPs may refer to a unique intensional entity. This line of  analysis, 
which is grounded on theories that associate weak reference to reference 
to kinds (Carlson 1977), has been recently advocated by Aguilar & 
Zwarts (2010), who analyze the defi nite DP in (1)-(3) as denoting the 
name of  the kind (Krifka, 2003; Dayal, 2004). Assuming that the domain 
of  individuals is sorted into kinds and objects, the defi nite determiner 
in (1)-(3) refers to unique individuals of  the kind sort (see also sec. 3).1
(ii) Prototypicality and semantic enrichment The second issue 
raised by weak DPs concerns their restriction to NPs belonging to 
specifi c lexical classes and their interpretive constraints. Let’s consider, 
as an example, the sentence (5-b). Contrary to the newspaper in (4-b), the 
1 A third option is suggested by Carlson and Sussman (2005), who give an ambiguous denotation 
to the defi nite determiner and analyze it as a marker of  indefi niteness in weak DPs. There are 
several theoretical problems that make this proposal unappealing, the fi rst being the fact that it 
predicts a systematic ambiguity of  the defi nite determiner, which is unattested in other contexts
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book in (5-b) cannot receive a weak interpretation and, accordingly, it 
does not allow for a sloppy reading. (5-b) entails that Lola and Alice are 
reading the same book or different tokens of  the same book, and the 
sentence cannot describe the situation depicted by (5-a), where Alice 
and Lola are reading different books.
(5)  a.  Lola is reading Animal Farm, and Alice is reading 1984.
b.  Lola is reading the book and Alice too.
This apparently incongruous distributional constraint has been 
explained, both by Carlson & Sussman (2005) and Aguilar & Zwarts 
(2011), by imposing a ‘prototypicality’ condition on the event in the 
denotation of  the VP within which the defi nite expressions appear. 
According to this condition, only ‘prototypical’ participants to the event 
denoted by the verb allow for ‘weak’ defi nite reference. Prototypicality 
has then been linked, via the stereotypical usages associated with the 
NP, to a third salient semantic property of  defi nite DPs, defi ned as a 
‘semantic enrichment’ of  the compositional meaning of  the VP (Carlson 
and Sussman, 2005). In most cases the VP in which weak DPs appear 
receives an interpretation that goes beyond its strict compositional 
meaning. As observed also by Aguilar and Zwarts (2011), the sentence in 
(1) means not only that Lola read the newspaper, but, additionally, that 
she read the newspaper in order to read the news. Therefore, (4-b) does 
not allow for a sloppy reading, and thus a ‘weak’ defi nite interpretation, 
if  Alice and Lola are reading the newspaper for some other purpose. 
Thus, (7) would be infelicitous in a context where (6) is true.
(6) Lola is reading The Times, and Alice is reading The    
Star
(7) ??Lola is reading the newspaper to look for job  
announcements, and Alice too.
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Intensional accounts such as Carlson and Sussman (2005)’s and 
Aguilar & Zwarts (2011)’s take for granted that a discourse external, non-
compositional principle supersedes the availability of  ‘well-established’ 
or ‘prototypical’ situations to which weak expressions may refer.2 Corblin 
(2011), on the other hand, makes the possibility of  weak interpretations 
dependent on the information stored in the lexicon. The association of  
an entity to a stereotypical activity is mapped explicitly into the functional 
qualia structure of  the NP (Pustejovsky, 1995). Enriched meanings are 
due, in both cases, to pragmatic inferences conventionally associated to 
the content of  the compositional expression.
The description in terms of  prototypicality, which is in some sense 
common to all previous proposals, indeed captures an important 
generalization. The fact that only NPs which are related to the verb as 
participants of  prototypical events allow for weak readings suggests that 
their weak interpretation should rely on a specifi c inferential mechanism. 
While I do agree with this important intuition, I would like to explore 
the possibility of  a more principled explanation for the restriction of  
weak DPs to prototypical situations. Namely, my aim here is to explore 
the possibility that the accessibility of  referents is determined by the 
compositional meaning of  the DP, that is, by the semantics of  the defi nite 
determiner. I thus rejoin the proposals outlined above in assuming that 
the defi nite determiner preserves its uniqueness presupposition also in its 
‘weak’ interpretation. Besides a presupposition of  uniqueness, however, 
I will assume that the defi nite determiner conveys also a presupposition 
of  familiarity (Roberts, 2003), and I will show that enforcing pragmatic 
principles on the presupposition of  familiarity may suffi ce to explain 
prototypicality constraints on weak readings. 
I will argue, in particular, that the relevance of  semantic enrichment 
can be questioned. My argument will rely partly on the evidence provided 
2 See e.g. Carlson (2006), and Schwarz (2012), who explicitly quotes Mithun (1984)’s defi nition 
of  noun incorporation as restricted to expressions denoting an activity that ‘is recognized 
suffi ciently often to be considered nameworthy’.
Weak (In) Definites, Familiarity and Reference to Kinds: The View From Italian
154
by weak defi nite descriptions in Italian. As I will show in section 1, weak 
defi nite DPs in Italian can be grouped into (at least) two distinct sub-
classes on the basis of  their interpretation, and, despite being in all 
cases subjects to prototypicality restrictions, only a subclass of  weak 
DPs in this language conveys a semantically enriched meaning. The 
observation that semantic enrichment is not a mandatory property of  
these structures, by weakening the arguments of  the analyses assumed by 
both Aguilar-Guevara and Zwarts (2011) and Corblin (2011), prompts to 
adopt a broader notion of  prototypicality, which encompasses also the 
cases where the interpretation is not directly guided by the information 
stored in the lexical entry of  the NP. I will suggest, in section 2, to 
ground prototypicality on the notion of  ‘weak’ familiarity (Heim 1982, 
Roberts 2003), and discuss in the following section the implications of  
my analysis for previous proposals. 
1 Weak defi nite DPs in Italian and (the lack of) semantic 
enrichment
1.1 Weak readings of  Italian defi nite DPs 
It is well known that in Italian, as in most Romance languages, defi nite 
DPs can receive distinct interpretations, from object-level defi nite 
expressions (8) to kinds and names of  kinds (9, 10). In the episodic 
sentence in (8), the defi nite DP il leone ‘the lion’ may be interpreted only 
as referring to a previously mentioned, unique individual in context. 
(8) Gli spari hanno fatto fuggire il    leone
 the  shots made.PF    escape  the lion
 ‘The shots have made the lion run away.’
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On the other hand, in the generic statements in (9) and (10) below, 
both the singular and the plural defi nite DP refer to the kind LION, and 
not to a specifi c individual or group of  individuals (Dobrovie-Sorin and 
Laca, 2003; Chierchia, 1998). The defi nite singular refers to the name of  
the kind, whereas the plural DP in (10) refers to the kind as the maximal 
individual represented by all its actual instances (Krifka et alii, 1995).
(9) Il leone ha                 una folta criniera
 the lion have.PRES   a     thick mane
 ‘The lion has a thick mane.’
(10)  I    leoni hanno          una folta criniera
 the lions have.PRES a      thick mane
 ‘Lions have a thick mane.’
In this paper, I will discuss the case in which defi nite DPs receive 
a weak indefi nite reading, which can be found more frequently with 
singular DPs.3 A fi rst relevant example is the singular defi nite DP il 
giornale ‘the newspaper’ in (11).4
(11) In questi giorni, non ho letto  il giornale.
 in these days    NEG read.PF the newspaper
 ‘These days, I did not read the newspaper.’
3 There is a second case, discussed in the literature, where plural defi nite DPs have been analysed 
as existential expressions, cf. (i) below.
(i) I leoni hanno invaso il Serengeti quest’estate.
 Lions invaded the Serengeti this summer.
In recent works (Zamparelli, 2002; Donazzan and Gritti, 2012) the defi nite DP in (i) is related to 
the kind-referring DP in (10), and the existential reading is derived by some type of  existential 
instantiation at the VP-level. We will not be concerned with these examples here.  
4 The acceptability judgments for the Italian data were collected on a panel of  10 native Italian 
speakers, all of  which had been living, for at least 20 years, in the same geographical area 
corresponding to the North-East (8) and North-West (2) of  Italy. Except for the answers of  one 
speaker, the judgments are quite uniform. 
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DPs like il giornale in (11) behave in all respects as weak indefi nite 
DPs in English. As it is the case for the English example in (1), the 
defi nite DP in (11) need not refer to a specifi c newspaper for the 
sentence to be true. The meaning conveyed by the sentence is rather that 
the speaker did not read any (instance of) newspapers in the latest days. 
The weakness of  the DP can be verifi ed if  we apply the test of  sloppy 
readings (Carlson and Sussman (2005); see also section 1). The sentence 
in (12-b) can be uttered felicitously in a context where (12-a) is also true, 
and Maria and Lara did not read the same newspaper.
(12)  a. Maria ha letto La Repubblica e Lara ha letto Il Corriere
  Maria read.PF La Repubblica and Lara read.PF Il Corriere
  ‘Maria read La Repubblica and Lara read Il Corriere.’
 b. Maria ha letto il giornale, e anche Lara.
  Maria read.PF the newspaper and also Lara
  ‘Maria read the newspaper and Lara did too.’
Prototypicality restrictions are relevant for this group of  defi nite 
expressions as well. In its weak interpretation, the defi nite DP in (11) 
contrasts with (13), where a weak reading is not available, as attested by 
(13-a)–(13-b) vs. (12-a)-(12b).
(13)  In questi giorni, non ho letto  #la rivista.
 in these days    NEG read.PF the magazine
 ‘These days, I did not read #the magazine.’
 a. Maria ha letto Oggi e Lara ha letto Gente
  Maria read.PF Oggi  and Lara read.PF Gente
  ‘Maria read Oggi and Lara read Gente.’
 b.  #Maria ha letto la rivista, e anche Lara.
  Maria read.PF the magazine and also Lara
  ‘Maria read the magazine and Lara too.’
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Finally, as it is the case in English, the VP leggere il giornale ‘to read 
the newspaper’ in (11)-(12) may also have a non-compositional, enriched 
meaning, by which Maria and Lara read the newspaper in order to read 
the news, and it entails this enriched meaning in its weak interpretation. 
What is interesting for the present purpose, however, is that VPs 
with weak DP arguments in Italian do not need to convey enriched 
meanings in all cases. Some relevant examples are given in sentences 
(14) - (16) below5.
(14)  Esco   a   bere  il    caffè   al       bar.
 go out to drink the coffee at-the bar
 ‘I’m going out to have a coffee at the bar.’
(15)  Pietro ha guardato i cartoni animati tutto il  pomeriggio.
  Pietro watch.PF the cartoons all the afternoon
 ‘Pietro watched cartoons all the afternoon.’
(16)  Invece di studiare, Maria ha passato il pomeriggio a     
leggere i fumetti.
 Instead of  study Maria spend.PF the afternoon to read  the   
comics
 ‘Instead of  studying Maria spent the afternoon readings   
comics.’
The defi nite DPs in the sentences (14)-(16) behave like weak defi nite 
DPs in most respects. The defi nite DP il caffè ‘the coffee’, as the English 
translation also suggests, receives a count interpretation and it allows for 
sloppy readings in coordinated elliptical sentence, cf. (17), where Maria 
and Lara obviously cannot have drunk the same cup of  coffee.
5 DPs like the ones in (15) and (16), albeit having not strictly speaking singular referents, can be 
argued to be similar to pluralia tantum in Italian. Cf. also Carlson and Sussman (2005) for similar 
cases in English, like comics and cartoons.
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(17)  Maria ha bevuto il   caffè   al       bar, e     anche Lara.
 Maria drink.PF  the coffee at-the bar, and also    Lara
 ‘Maria drunk a coffee at the bar and Lara as well.’
Prototypicality is also at issue, since in the sentence (18), where 
coffee is replaced by herbal tea, the DP is not felicitous under a weak 
interpretation. 
(18) ??Maria ha bevuto la tisana       al  bar,        e     anche Lara.
  Maria    drink.PF the herbal tea at-the bar, and also   Lara
 ‘Maria drank the herbal at the bar and Lara as well.’
However, contrary to what has been observed for DPs such as il 
giornale ‘the newspaper’ in (11), there is no salient functional or non-
compositional meaning associated with the VP. When uttering (16), the 
speaker expresses nothing more than his/her intention to drink a coffee 
at the bar. Therefore, we may conclude that if  Italian defi nite DPs can 
receive a weak reading that satisfy the standard tests established for weak 
DPs (they do not refer to unique entities and are subject to distributional 
restrictions), in this language we may have found a wider group of  weak 
DPs, comprising defi nite expressions that, like il caffè, do not display 
salient enriched meanings.
1.2  About enriched meanings and the lack thereof  
At this point, I would like to be more precise about what is intended 
as an enriched meaning of  the VP and in what sense Italian weak DPs 
such as the ones in (14)-(16) do not display this meaning component 
in their interpretation. I will rely on the analysis by which enriched 
meanings are described as conventional implicatures (Stvan 1992, 1993), 
and I will show that, for the relevant weak DPs, the standard tests used 
to detect implicated meaning do not easily apply. 
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Enriched meanings and prototypicality restrictions have fi rst been 
discussed extensively in the literature about incorporation and pseudo-
incorporation. Various authors noticed that bare NPs complements of  
verbs or prepositions usually convey a non-compositional, additional 
meaning across languages. For expressions like to be in prison, for instance, 
it has been suggested to describe enriched meanings as pragmatic 
inferences attached to the conventional meaning associated with the 
bare NP. In other words, if  prisons are places conventionally associated 
with the function of  holding prisoners, the fact that John is in prison 
triggers the pragmatic inference that he is there as a prisoner. 
In her paper, Stvan (1992) is particularly careful in determining the type of  
implicated meaning that bare NPs convey and she concludes that it should be described 
as a conventional rather than a conversational implicature (Levinson 2000). Some of  her 
arguments can be applied also to weak DPs. First, like conventional implicatures and 
unlike conversational ones, the meaning attached to weak DPs cannot be negated in a 
subsequent sentence. An example is given below: if  (19), under a weak reading of  the 
DP, conventionally implicates (a), then a weak reading in (b) should be infelicitous, and 
indeed it is.
(19)  Oggi   Maria   ha letto    il giornale.
 today  Maria   read.PF    the newspaper
 ‘Today Maria read the newspaper.’
a. Maria read the news.
b. Oggi Maria ha letto #il giornale, ma non ha letto le 
notizie.
 ‘Today Maria read #the newspaper, but she did not read 
the news.’
Furthermore, conventional implicatures are non-detachable, in the 
sense that an utterance with the same conventional force cannot replace 
the original one without losing the implicated meaning. This property is 
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attested by the fact that, as has been shown extensively in the previous 
sections, weak DPs are constrained to specifi c lexical NPs, and they 
cannot be freely substituted by synonymous words. However, it is also 
a meaning that depends from the denotation of  the whole DP, since 
‘weak’ DPs contrast with indefi nite and ‘strong’ ones in this respect. 
Now I will apply the tests to weak defi nite DPs such as those in 
(14)-(16) above. To start with, let’s consider now bere il caffè ’drink the 
coffee’ in sentences like (14) and (17). I argued, in section 1.1, that no 
salient enriched meanings are associated with this VP. However, it may 
also be argued that drinking a coffee can be seen as an activity charged 
with some conventional meaning in a particular social background; for 
most Italian speakers, drinking a coffee is a daily activity often associated 
with breakfast or, more generally, with the intent of  getting awake when 
sleepy.6 Is this inference strong enough, however, to be a pragmatic 
inference conventionally associated with the meaning of  the VP? Testing 
the inference shows that this is not the case. Even if  we suppose that 
the sentence in (20) implicates (a), the weak reading of  the DP is not 
affected in (b), where (a) is negated.
6 Thanks to Ana Aguilar-Guevara for pointing out this fact to me. A similar and relevant remark 
has been raised also by one reviewer, who asked if  ‘coffee’ can be associated to any activity 
that has something to do with an activity of  taking a snack, possibly different than a coffee. 
According to my informants’ intuition, while bere il caffè ‘drink the coffee’ is indeed associated 
with coffee-drinking, to express the generic intent of  having a pause at the bar Italian speakers 
would rather make use of  the indefi nite article, cf. (i) below.    
(i) Chiamami uno di questi giorni, magari andiamo a bere un/#il caffè.
Call me one of  these days, maybe we can drink a/#the  coffee together
While the analysis of  (weak) indefi nite expressions as in (i) is clearly beyond the reach of  this 
paper, I am not sure that an analysis in terms of  incorporation can apply to indefi nite expressions. 
In any case, indefi nite DPs do not convey conventional implicatures as part of  their meaning, cf. 
(ii), where the sentence in (a) can be true in both situations depicted by (b) and (c).
(ii) a. Lola is reading a newspaper.
c. Lola is reading the news.
d. Lola is looking for job announcements.
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(20)  Esco   a   bere  il    caffè   al       bar.
 go out to drink the coffee at-the bar
 ‘I’m going out to have a coffee at the bar.’
a. I am sleepy and I need to get awake
b. Esco a bere il caffè al bar, ma non perché ho bisogno di 
svegliarmi
 ‘I’m going to have a coffee at the bar, but not because I 
want to wake up.’
Therefore, even if  one may argue that drinking a coffee and watching 
cartoons (15) also implicate an additional meaning (coffee is drunk 
as breakfast or to wake up, cartoons are watched for leisure etc.), this 
enriched meaning can be characterized, at best, only as a conversational 
implicature.
On a descriptive ground we may thus attempt at dividing weak 
defi nites in Italian into two groups. Group1 is made of  NPs which can 
be arguments of  VPs that have a non-strictly compositional, enriched 
meaning. NPs of  this group most frequently denote media (newspaper, 
radio), institutions (school, hospital, university), professions (doctor, lawyer, 
plumber) or places (beach, university) that are conventionally related to 
a social routine which associates the place to an activity (Vandeloise, 
1987). Indeed, these NPs have in common the property, captured by 
the analysis of  Corblin (2011), of  including in their lexical entry an 
additional meaning, or qualia, which specifi es a salient functional use or 
teleologic component. Thus, reading the newspaper is understood as reading 
the news in virtue of  the fact that a newspaper is defi ned, conventionally, 
qua the daily vehicle of  news. However, weak readings in Italian are 
also attested for NPs that denote a more heterogeneous set of  entities. 
These Group2 NPs may also be associated to standard functions, but 
their functional component is less salient. For instance, magazines and 
comics are primarily designed to be read, and probably their function 
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is to inform or entertain the reader, but these functional qualia are 
not salient enough to surface as conventional meanings associated 
to them. Accordingly, these NPs, when interpreted as weak defi nites, 
do not contribute enriched meanings to the VP. But then, where do 
their restrictions come from? And how is the referent of  the NP made 
accessible to the hearer in this case?
2  Familiarity constraints on weak readings
I have shown in section 1 that not all Italian weak defi nite DPs display 
the whole set of  defi ning properties outlined in the introduction. In the 
remainder of  the paper, I will suggest that the common property of  
Italian weak defi nite DPs can still be defi ned in terms of  prototypicality, 
once the defi nition of  this latter notion is made suitable to cover also the 
case of  Group2 weak DPs. 
I will endorse the notion of  prototypicality of  situations and events 
as defi ned in the literature on incorporation: prototypical situations are 
situations suffi ciently established as recurrent and habitual routines to 
be considered part of  the conventional knowledge shared by speaker 
and hearer (Mithun, 1984).7 I will show that, in this specifi c sense, 
prototypicality can be associated to the notion of  familiarity. Prototypical 
situations are also familiar situations in the common ground, that is, in 
the shared knowledge of  speaker and hearer. More precisely, prototypical 
situations are entailed by the common ground which is established 
by the information conventionally shared by the participants to the 
conversation. 
Familiarity, defi ned as a presupposition triggered by defi nite 
descriptions, has been fi rst introduced in the work by Heim (1982) and it 
has been tied, also in more recent works (Corblin, 1987; Roberts, 2003), 
7 That is to say, the notion of  prototypicality that I will assume is not the one defi ned in cognitive 
psychology, cf. e.g. Rosch (1978), which has been introduced in semantics by the Prototype 
Theory.
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to the semantics of  nominal expressions My purpose here is to suggest 
that the presupposition of  familiarity triggered by a defi nite description 
can be transferred, if  conditions are met, up to the denotational domain 
of  the VP of  which the defi nite DPs are arguments. To this effect, I will 
assume that the relevant notion of  familiarity is a ‘weakened’ familiarity 
condition (Roberts, 2003), and that the interpretation of  weak DPs is 
driven by the two principles in (21).
(21)  (i)  Weak defi nite determiners share the semantics of    
 ‘strong’ defi nite determiners: they convey a    
 presupposition of  uniqueness and of  existence of    
 their referent (Russell, 1905; Strawson, 1950),    
 together with a strong presumption of  familiarity   
 (Corblin, 1987).
  (ii) The presupposition of  uniqueness cannot be    
 satisfi ed without satisfying familiarity (Roberts, 2003)
In the remainder of  this section, I will discuss the relevance of  each 
of  the two assumptions outlined above.
2.1 From weakly familiar to prototypical situations  
According to the defi nition by Roberts (2003), defi nite DPs convey 
a presupposition of  familiarity and of  uniqueness in a conversational 
context. Given a conversational context C, a defi nite DP presupposes 
that it has as antecedent a discourse referent x which is:
(22)  a.  Weakly familiar in C (i.e. entailed by C)
 b.  Unique among discourse referents in C to satisfy the   
 descriptive content of  the NP.
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The condition of  weak familiarity formulated in (22) is suffi cient to 
explain the felicity of  the defi nite DP il giornale ‘the newspaper’ in (23).
(23)  Oggi   mi sono fermato all’edicola. Ma poi tornando ho   
dimenticato il giornale su una panchina al  parco
 today CL stop.PFat-the newsstand but then come. back.GER  
forget.PF  the newspaper on a  bench     at-the park
 ‘Today I stopped at the newsstand; but then, on my way  
back, I forgot the newspaper on a bench at the park’.
In (23), the existence of  the referent for the defi nite expression il 
giornale ‘the newspaper’, which has not been directly introduced in the 
discourse, is entailed by the context created by the fi rst sentence. The 
newspaper refers to the sample of  newspaper that I am supposed to 
have bought at the newsstand, that is, a weakly familiar entity entailed by 
the common ground C after the utterance of  the fi rst sentence.
On the other hand, when the presupposition of  familiarity cannot 
be satisfi ed by entailment in C, the use of  a defi nite DP is predicted to 
be infelicitous. Indeed, if  (24) is uttered out of  the blue, the use of  the 
defi nite expression is not felicitous anymore. The hearer cannot recover 
a referent for the defi nite expression from the conversational context, 
since churches are not places where newspapers can be usually found or 
acquired.
(24)  Oggi   mi sono fermato in chiesa.    Ma poi tornando ho   
dimenticato #il giornale    su una panchina al parco.
 today CL stop.PF    in church but then come-back.GER  
 forget.PF  the newspaper on a bench    at-the park.
 ‘Today I stopped at the church. But then, on my way back, I 
forgot #the newspaper on a bench at the park.’
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However, the DP in (24) can still guarantee a felicitous use of  the 
defi nite determiner if  both speaker and hearer share the information 
that the speaker has the habit of  going out in order to buy a newspaper 
every day. How would this conversational, non-conventional implicature 
be justifi ed? 
Familiarity, which, according to (22), is always relative to a 
conversational background, can also be seen as a more general 
conversational principle. This is one of  the implications of  the defi nition 
proposed by Corblin (1987) for the présomption de familiarité, by which «en 
utilisant un défi ni, le locuteur indique que la description fournie par le GN est 
suffi sante pour permettre à son interlocuteur d’identifi er l’individu particulier dont il 
a l’intention de parler».8 
The hypothesis that I want to develop here is that the conventional 
meaning attached to the defi nite expression in (21), which is due to 
the semantics of the defi nite determiner, triggers the conversational 
principle evidenced by Corblin (1987). These two pieces of  information 
are precisely what guide the interpretation of  weak defi nite DPs and 
restrict them to VPs that denote prototypical situations.
Let’s see how this works in a stepwise fashion. Suppose that hearer 
and speaker also share the conversational principle triggered by the 
presumption of  familiarity of  the defi nite determiner, by which the 
hearer expects that the defi nite expression is used effi ciently and the 
information given is suffi cient in order to identify a referent for it. After 
extending the common ground to a conversational context C, in cases 
where there is no referent for the DP in C the hearer makes a further 
move and opens up the common ground also to the set of  habitual 
activities, to which he has access, where the existence of  a unique, 
defi nite DP can be entailed. 
8 ‘When using a defi nite [expression], the speaker states that the description conveyed by the 
NP is suffi cient for the hearer to identify the specifi c individual that he/she is addressing’. The 
presumption of  familiarity can be derived by a pragmatic principle based on the hearer-oriented 
Maxim of  Quantity, ‘Make your contribution suffi cient’, cf. Horn (1985); Levinson (2000).
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We may now take a step further, and suppose that familiarity is not 
necessarily restricted to the shared knowledge of  individual habits or 
routines. It may be entailed by a more conventionalized knowledge. Let’s 
consider now the sentence in (25). Contrary to the defi nite DP in (23) and 
(24), the defi nite DP the newspaper in (25) is easily interpreted as a weak 
defi nite DP independently of  a specifi c conversational background.
(25)  Oggi   mi sono fermato al parco e ho letto il giornale
 seduto su una panchina
 today CL stop.PF  at-the park and read.PF the newspaper sit on a 
bench
 ‘Today I stopped at the park and I read the newspaper sitting 
on a bench.’
Why is it so? An explanation in terms of  familiarity presupposition 
would say that, since the possibility of  attributing to the newspaper 
a referent directly or indirectly introduced in the discourse is not 
given, the defi nite DP in (25) is understood as the participant of  a 
conventionally familiar situation. To read the newspaper is indeed a 
familiar, quite standard situation in the shared knowledge of  English 
and Italian speakers. The fact that it is the familiarity of  situations which 
is relevant can be appreciated also if  we put the situation in context. 
The acceptability of  the defi nite DP is degraded in (26): while a park 
is one of  the standard frames for prototypical situations of  reading the 
newspaper, a church is arguably less so.
(26)  Oggi mi sono fermato in chiesa e ho letto #il giornale 
 seduto su un banco
 today CL stop.PF in church  and read.PF the newspaper sit on a bench
 ‘Today I stopped at the church and I read the newspaper 
sitting on a bench.’
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The defi nition in (22) may thus be revised as in (27). 
(27)  If  the condition of  familiarity in C fails, then widen the   
common ground to C’, which is a proper superset of  C   
comprising also familiar situations, and fi nd a referent x   
to NP which is:
a.  Weakly familiar in C’ (i.e. entailed by C’)
b.  Unique among discourse referents in C’ to satisfy the 
descriptive content of  the NP.
The instruction in (27) maintains that the defi nite determiner has 
both a familiarity and a uniqueness presupposition. Moreover, it takes 
the pragmatic reasoning triggered by the presumption of  familiarity as 
a last resort strategy, which entails the widening of  the context C only 
when possible referents are not accessible among the set of  referents 
entailed by C. 
It is easy to show that this defi nition is suffi cient to account for all the 
occurrences of  weak DPs discussed up to now, which share the minimal 
common property of  denoting the participants of  familiar situations in 
a shared background of  habits, dispositions and conventions. Let me 
point out another welcome consequence. While the extension of  the 
background is enough in order to cover the prototypicality restrictions 
observed for both Group1 and Group2 weak defi nite DPs, the semantic 
enrichment proper to Group1 DPs can still be treated as part of  the 
lexical meaning of  the NPs of  this group. This analysis in terms of  
familiarity, in other words, turns out to be compatible with the explanation 
of  enriched meanings in terms of  functional qualia proposed by Corblin 
(2011). I will not follow Corblin, however, when functional qualia 
become the triggers of  the inference that allows recovering the referent 
of  the DP. In my mind, it is the presumption of  familiarity associated 
to the defi nite article that is responsible for this. The advantage of  the 
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proposal outlined here is precisely that the extension of  the background, 
which ensures the interpretations of  weak DPs in familiar situations, is 
prompted by the semantics associated with the defi nite article, which is 
the other common feature of  these nominal expressions.
3  Uniqueness and sloppy readings
It is worth noticing, at this point, that Roberts (2003) herself  
suggested that the shared conversational background C which satisfi es 
weak familiarity presuppositions should include knowledge of  habitual 
or recurrent activities. The point is made with respect to the sentence 
(28) (from Birner and Ward (1994)).
(28)  Johnny, go stand in the corner.
In (28), as argued by Roberts, the felicity of  the defi nite expression 
is obviously not due to the presence of  a unique corner in the room, but 
rather to the existence of  a unique corner where kids usually stand when they 
are bad. In other words, there is just one relevant entity in the context 
that is the referent of  the DP, and its identity can be recovered by shared 
knowledge about habitual situations.
I will take this example as a start to make two observations, which 
have both to do with the uniqueness presupposition associated with the 
defi nite expression.
The fi rst point concerns the relevance of  familiarity in satisfying 
the presupposition of  existence. The account for the interpretation 
of  the defi nite expression in (28) makes use of  an enriched meaning 
attached to it. This enriched meaning is not derived from a functional 
use conventionally associated to corners, but rather from the existence 
of  familiar situations of  standing in a corner, where standing in a corner 
is associated with a punishment. Why is this reading so salient, however? 
Marta Donazzan
169
Why cannot (28) just mean that Johnny has to stand in the corner where 
he is going to stand, or (29) mean that John stood in the corner where 
he actually stood?
(29)  Johnny stood in the corner [in which he stood].
In other words, we may object that, given that there is only one 
relevant corner involved in the event, bridging from situations should 
in principle be possible. Yet, this is clearly not the case, and it should 
not be the case indeed, since it would predict that defi nite DPs would 
be allowed in almost all contexts. An answer to this objection, and to 
its undesirable consequences, is given by the second principle assumed 
under (21) in section 2, which subordinates the presupposition of  
uniqueness to contextual entailment. This condition ensures that 
bridging from events and situations is not a freely available mechanism, 
but that it is restrained to contextually accessible events and situations, where 
contextually accessible events and situations are those that are entailed 
by the shared knowledge of  speaker and hearer about recurrent, habitual 
or prototypical situations. 9
The second point about (28) has to do with uniqueness and sloppy 
readings. So far, the account given by Roberts says that there is a unique 
corner which is concerned with kid’s punishment in C. Under this 
interpretation, sloppy readings would not be possible, contrary to fact: 
(30) would be true only in a situation where both John and Mary stood 
in the same corner (a), but in fact the sentence is a felicitous utterance 
also in the context provided by (b), where Mary and John actually stood 
in two different corners.
9 An observation in the same spirit has been pointed out by one of  the reviewers, who suggests 
that uniqueness may be a byproduct of  the specifi city of  the situation and therefore it arises as 
a de re reading once a relevant situation has been provided. It seems to me that this observation 
is in line with the present proposal, and is indeed accounted for by (21ii), which states that the 
presupposition of  uniqueness is satisfi ed only if  familiarity is also satisfi ed. 
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(30) John stood in the corner the whole morning, and Mary   
as well.
a.  Mary and John stood in the corner where kids usually 
stand when they are bad
b.  Mary was sent to the corner by her teacher for the whole 
morning, and John was sent to the corner by his mom for 
the whole morning.
The problem, at this point, is to combine the presupposition of  
uniqueness with the emergence of  sloppy readings. 
In the following, I will discuss the hypothesis that sloppy readings 
are in fact due to the existence of  a plurality of  situations involving 
unique participants, and that, once familiarity is satisfi ed, bridging from 
events may still be part of  the interpretational mechanism. The essence 
of  this proposal is known to the literature at least since the work of  
Löbner (1985), but it has been explicitly criticized by Aguilar-Guevara 
and Zwarts (2011) and Schwarz (2012), whose arguments rely on the data 
of  sloppy readings or on the ‘co-varying’ reading of  defi nite expressions, 
respectively. In the following, I will try to make a contribution to the 
debate by considering anaphora resolution.
3.1 Anaphora and the incorporation hypothesis 
As recalled in the introductory section, in their recent analysis of  
English weak DPs Aguilar-Guevara and Zwarts (2011) assume that 
weak defi nite DPs refer to names of  kinds, and propose that the defi nite 
expression undergoes a process of  semantic incorporation into the VP. 
In order to obtain a compositional meaning, the authors implement their 
analysis with some additional assumptions, the most salient being that, 
since the kind cannot be instantiated existentially in episodic sentences, 
the DP is introduced as argument of  a realization relation R (McNally 
and Espinal, 2011), which prevents existential binding for the argument 
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variable of  the event. I will not take up again here the empirical and 
theoretical problems that arise from the treatment of  enriched meanings 
in the authors’ proposal, but I will point out some problems following, 
more generally, from the hypothesis of  semantic incorporation.
 The fi rst theoretical problem is evidenced by considering the 
resolution of  anaphora in sentences (31) and (32). 
(31)  (i)  Alice did a solo on the saxophone.
 (ii)  ?She did not realize that it was out of  tune.
The fi rst sentence in (31) is an episodic sentence where the DP may 
receive a weak or a strong interpretation. If  the DP is interpreted as 
referring to an object-level entity, in its ‘strong’ reading, an anaphoric 
relation can be easily established with the pronoun in the second 
sentence. Under the weak reading of  the DP, however, an anaphoric 
relation should be ruled out, since the relation R prevents individual 
instances of  the kind to be directly accessible as discourse referents. 
The low acceptability of  (31ii), reported by Aguilar-Guevara and Zwarts 
(2011), thus shows that, when the sentence is uttered out-of-the-blue, 
the weak interpretation of  the DP is indeed the default one.
However, if, as in (32), possible antecedents are provided even 
indirectly in the context, the strong reading of  the DP is clearly preferred, 
and the anaphoric relation is straightforward.
(32)  (Every kid picked an instrument to play at the recital.) 
 (i)  Alice did a solo on the saxophonei.
 (ii)  She did not realize that iti was out of  tune.
It appears then that kind readings are only a default, and reference 
to an individual is preferred whenever an antecedent is available in the 
context. As observed also by Beyssade (2012), a principled explanation 
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accounting for this empirical fact would be a welcome consequence of  
any theory of  weak reference.
Upon a close scrutiny, we may see that the interpretation of  the 
saxophone in (32) relies on the same familiarity principle that justifi es 
the interpretation of  the weak DP the newspaper in the example (23) in 
section 2, in which, as I argued, the weak reading of  the DP should be 
accounted for by appealing to the presupposition of  familiarity conveyed 
by the defi nite determiner. It appears then that an account in terms of  
familiarity presupposition can indeed offer a principled explanation. If  
the widening of  the conversational context is a move prompted by the 
non-availability of  directly accessible discourse referents, this predicts 
that the referential interpretation of  the DP is preferred when an 
antecedent is accessible in the linguistic or conversational context, and 
habitual or conventional situations are evoked only when the existence 
of  a unique referent is more diffi cult to accommodate.
3.2  Anaphora and existential instantiations
A second problematic issue is that the infelicity of  weak DPs as 
antecedents of  anaphors is not uncontroversial. The Italian episodic 
sentence (33) is, for most speakers, a perfectly acceptable utterance, 
whereas the contrast with (34), where the antecedent is found in a 
generic statement, is quite sharp.
(33)  Maria ha bevuto il caffèi al bar, ma non loi ha pagato.
 Maria drink.PF the coffee at-the bar but NEG CL pay.PF
 ‘Maria drank the coffee at the bar, but she didn’t pay it.’
(34)  Maria beve il caffèi, ma oggi non #loi ha pagato.
 Maria drink.PRES the coffee but today NEG CL pay.PF
 ‘#Maria drinks coffee, but today she didn’t pay it.’
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The problem of  anaphoric binding has been brought up also in 
the analysis by Corblin (2011), which he develops focusing on French 
defi nite DPs in PPs, cf. (35).
(35)  Marie est       à  l’hôpital/#à la librairie.
 Marie is.PRES at the hospital/ at the bookshop
 ‘Marie is at the hospital/ #at the bookshop.’
If  we apply the tests outlined in section 1, we can see that the 
defi nite DP in (35) displays the defi ning properties assumed for weak 
DPs. It allows for multiple referents in elliptical sentences (36), and the 
weak reading is available only for a restricted class of  NPs, as seen in 
the contrast in (35). Moreover, they also display enriched meanings: (35) 
naturally entails that Marie is at the hospital in order to be healed.
(36)  Pierre est à l’hôpital, et Marie aussi
 Pierre is at the hospital  and Mary also
 ‘Pierre is at the hospital, and Mary as well.’
Corblin (2011) argues explicitly against an intensional analysis for the 
DPs in the previous examples, and defi nes these weak defi nites as ‘para-
intensional’ defi nites. He supports his claim with two main arguments, 
which are construed upon the evidence provided by anaphora resolution. 
First, he argues that the DP l’hôpital in (35) can easily be the antecedent 
of  an anaphoric pronoun, cf. (37). As it is the case for the Italian weak 
defi nite in (33), the accessibility of  the antecedent in an episodic sentence 
is defi nitely easier, according to the author, than that of  a DP which is 
embedded in a generic or characterizing sentence.
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(37)  Marie est à  l’hôpitali. Comme ili n’est pas loin, je vais la voir 
souvent.
 Marie is.PRES at the hospital since it is not far I go CL see often 
 ‘Marie is at the hospital. Since it is not too far, I go to see her 
often.’
Another clue for the existence of  object-level entities is the possibility 
of  questioning the identity of  the referent of  the DP. As reported by the 
author, asking which the hospital where Marie is hospitalized is can be a 
felicitous follow-up to (35). 
Examples of  this kind suggest that episodic sentences may involve 
existential instantiation, be it either at the level of  the individuals in the 
denotation of  the DP or at the level of  the whole VP, as suggested 
recently by Schwarz (2012). The solution outlined in Schwarz (2012) 
involves incorporation of  the referent of  the DP into the verb phrase, 
but crucially makes its existence guaranteed through the instantiation of  
the situations of  which it is a participant. Without going into the details 
of  Schwarz (2012)’s analysis, let me point out an empirical fact that may 
support it. In French is possible to co-index the antecedent in (37) not 
only with the masculine pronoun il, which agrees in gender with the NP 
hôpital, but also with the non-agreeing neutral pronoun ce, which may 
refer to a situation, cf. (38).10
(38)  Marie est à  l’hôpitali. Comme cei n’est pas loin, je vais la voir 
souvent.
 Marie is.PRES at the hospital since it.NEUT is not far I go CL see 
often 
 ‘Marie is at the hospital. Since it is not too far, I go to see her 
often.’
10 Thanks to Pascal Amsili for this empirical observation.
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This analysis predicts that the referents of  weak defi nite DPs are 
not directly accessible for anaphoric pronouns, but they are still unique 
as participants to the events in the situation denoted by the VP. The 
uniqueness presupposition is guaranteed as part of  the semantics of  
the defi nite article also in this ‘weakened’ interpretation, in line with the 
defi nition (27).
Conclusions and further issues
In this paper, I defended a unifi ed analysis of  weak and strong 
defi nite expressions, based on the claim that the defi nite article bears 
in both cases a presupposition of  familiarity and of  uniqueness. I have 
shown that familiarity, as a more general conversational principle, helps 
also to understand the choice of  the interpretation of  weak and strong 
DPs in context, and that uniqueness, if  properly defi ned, can resist 
also to the empirical challenge of  sloppy readings. In a more general 
perspective, my aim is not to defend a specifi c denotational domain for 
weak DPs. My contribution in this paper is rather to suggest that the 
unifi ed analysis of  the defi nite determiner in its strong and weak reading, 
which has been the concern of  much of  the previous literature, may be 
pushed further, by considering all of  the semantic content associated to 
this functional item in its stronger interpretation.
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